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Although over sixty partners have joined the US-led coalition against the
Islamic State (IS), only a handful of states was willing to carry out air
strikes against IS-targets. This article aims to explain the pattern of dem-
ocratic participation in the air campaign. It builds on the rich literature
on military burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop a
multi-causal model, which is tested with Qualitative Comparative
Analysis. The results of the analysis suggest that the pattern of participa-
tion in the air strikes results from a complex interplay between alliance
politics, threat perception and domestic institutional constraints. The
threat posed by foreign fighters and a strong interest in a good relation-
ship with the US constituted important incentives to participate in the
air strikes, while a high level of parliamentary involvement in military
deployment decisions inhibited participation. Furthermore, states that
were situated in Russia’s immediate vicinity refrained from participating,
in spite of their strong dependence on the US’ security guarantee.
Lastly, the analysis did not provide convincing evidence that partisan pol-
itics had an impact on participation in the air strikes.
On August 7, 2014, the United States launched its first air strikes against the
Islamic State (IS). Although “Operation Inherent Resolve” started as a unilateral
intervention, the Obama administration began mobilizing a broad coalition of
allies as the air campaign intensified. At first glance, its efforts seem very success-
ful: Washington managed to enlist 58 countries as members of the “global coali-
tion to degrade and defeat ISIL” (Allen 2014). However, few allies actually
committed military forces to the coalition. At the time of writing (July 2015), only
thirteen countries have participated in offensive air operations. In consequence,
the United States kept playing a dominant role in the campaign, carrying out the
brunt of the air strikes.
Many states contributed to the fight against the IS in other ways, for example,
by sending arms, ammunition, or military instructors to reinforce Iraqi and
Kurdish forces. However, the financial and political costs of these contributions
fall far below the burdens involved in participating in combat operations. The lat-
ter not only entail more sizeable financial costs, but also a considerable risk of
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negative domestic ramifications and electoral punishment by casualty-averse con-
stituencies (Mello 2014, 75). Considering these costs and risks, the meekness of
most members of the anti-IS coalition might not be surprising. Nevertheless, sev-
eral states did carry out air strikes, indicating that these costs were not necessarily
insurmountable.
This article aims to explain the pattern of participation in the air strikes against
the IS. It builds on the rich scholarly literature on military burden sharing and dem-
ocratic peace theory to develop a multicausal model, which is tested with qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA). The results of the analysis suggest that the threat posed
by foreign fighters and a strong interest in a good relationship with the United
States constituted important incentives to participate in the air strikes, while a high
level of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions inhibited partic-
ipation. Furthermore, states that were situated in Russia’s immediate vicinity re-
frained from participating, in spite of their strong dependence on the United
States’ security guarantee. In contrast, the analysis did not provide convincing evi-
dence that partisan politics had an impact on participation in the air strikes.
The article proceeds as follows. The first section builds on the comprehensive
research on military burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop an
integrated model for explaining participation in the air strikes against the IS.
The second section justifies the case selection, introduces QCA as an appropriate
method to test the model, and discusses the measurement of the variables.
The third section presents the results of the analysis, which are interpreted
against the backdrop of the theoretical model in the fourth section. Lastly, the
study’s major findings are recapitulated in the conclusions.
Theoretical Framework
The pattern of participation in the air strikes against the IS presents a puzzle for
two of the major theories of multilateral military operations and armed conflict:
collective action theory and democratic peace theory. Collective action theory has
dominated research on military burden-sharing ever since the seminal article of
Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), which characterized defense as a pure public
good, implying that noncontributors cannot be excluded from enjoying its bene-
fits. In consequence, states have few incentives to contribute if a state with the
formidable military might of the United States is willing to unilaterally launch an
operation. The disproportionately large contribution of the United States to the
combat operations against the IS corresponds to expectations of the pure public
goods model. However, the latter cannot explain why several other states contrib-
uted to the strike operations instead of taking a free ride off the United States.
Research on democratic peace examines the link between democracy and
armed conflict. Democratic peace theory contends that there is “something in the
internal make up of democratic states” that makes them less warlike than semide-
mocracies and autocracies (Maoz and Russett 1993, 626). Although some studies
have examined whether democracies have less frequent domestic armed conflicts,
the brunt of democratic peace research focusses on the interstate democratic
peace (Hegre 2014, 624). This research almost consistently confirms that democ-
racies rarely fight each other, but there is less compelling evidence that democra-
cies are in general more peaceful. Since the vast majority of the anti-IS coalition
are full-fledged democracies, the general hesitancy to participate in the air strikes
suggests that democracies are indeed reluctant to deploy military means.
However, the fact that several democracies did carry out air strikes suggests con-
siderable variation among established democracies in their propensity to get in-
volved in armed conflict.
This study builds on more recent strands of the literature on military burden
sharing and democratic peace to explain the pattern of participation in the air
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strikes. After several authors convincingly argued that the public goods model does
not fully account for burden sharing decisions, more general joint product and in-
tegrated multicausal models were introduced to the study of burden sharing (see,
e.g., Sandler 1977; Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994; Shimizu and Sandler 2010).
The former assumes that military operations produce multiple benefits, varying
from purely public to country-specific and private benefits, the latter that contribu-
tions to multilateral operations are caused by a complex interaction between inter-
national and domestic-level variables. Insights from this line of research are com-
plemented with insights from a recent direction in democratic peace research,
which seeks to explain the varying conflict involvement of established democracies
(Prins and Sprecher 1999; Chan and Safran 2006; Schuster and Maier 2006).
Balance of Threats
Integrated models generally invoke the “balance-of-threats hypothesis” to explain
contributions to multilateral operations (e.g., Bennett et al. 1994, 42–44;
Auerswald 2004, 639; Davidson 2011, 174). This hypothesis builds on Stephen
Walt’s (1987) neo-realist theory of alliance formation, which contends that states
enter alliances to balance against threats. In the context of military operations,
the hypothesis expects states to contribute to operations that counter threats to
their national interest. The benefits of balancing against threats are only gained
by states to which the target of the intervention actually poses a threat. Such
country-specific benefits are taken into account in an alternative to the pure pub-
lic goods model: the joint products model (Sandler and Shimizu 2014, 46). This
assumes that military operations produce multiple goods, ranging from purely
public to country-specific and private benefits. If an operation mainly produces
country-specific joint products, contributions are expected to match the opera-
tion’s benefits. In line with the balance-of-threats hypothesis, the joint products
model would thus expect states that faced the highest level of threat to participate
in an operation.
The main threat posed by the rise of the IS is the increased risk of terrorist at-
tacks. Like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other recent targets of US-led interven-
tions, IS-controlled territory risks becoming a safe haven and training ground for
international jihadists (Choi and James 2014, 6–9). Countries that have been hit
hard by Islamic terrorist attacks in the past can be expected to be most responsive
to this increased terrorist threat (Sandler and Shimizu 2014, 50). Additionally, a
state’s concern with the rise of the IS might be connected to the number of na-
tionals that have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq. Governments and intelligence of-
ficials have expressed concerns that these volunteers might return home and use
their combat experience and battle training to carry out attacks in their home
countries (Bakker, Paulussen, and Entenman 2013, 4). Although it has been ar-
gued that “the threat presented by foreign fighters has been exaggerated,” re-
search on the subject suggests that returning militants pose a risk to their home
countries (Byman and Shapiro 2014). Nearly 30% of the individuals involved in
the twenty-six terrorist plots investigated by de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2014, 64) had
been abroad for fighting or training. According to Hegghammer (2013, 11), over
a quarter of all individuals involved in terrorist plots in the West are known to
have experience as foreign fighters, and 46% of all plots include at least one such
veteran. Moreover, his data indicates that the presence of foreign fighters in a ter-
rorist plot increases the probability that it will actually come to execution, as well
as the probability that people will get killed in the attack.
Since the number of western foreign fighters active in Syria is unprecedented
in modern history, the threat to their home countries should not be underesti-
mated (Lister 2014, 88). Recognizing this threat, however, does not automatically
imply it constitutes an incentive to participate in the air strikes. In fact, the strike
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operations are likely to increase the probability that returning IS fighters attempt
to carry out attacks in retaliation (Lister 2014, 97). However, countries with a
large number of foreign fighters are likely to perceive the costs of inaction as
higher. Not only did they experience the problem first hand and, thereby, have
undeniable evidence that their country is fertile recruiting ground for IS fighters,
returning militants also play an active role in radicalizing new jihadists
(Hegghammer 2013, 12). In consequence, states with a large number of militants
active in Syria have the greatest incentive to avoid the IS consolidating its terri-
tory, attracting more foreign fighters, and, thereby, becoming an even greater
threat to national security.
Alliance Politics
Alliance politics are a second plausible explanatory variable for the pattern of par-
ticipation in the air strikes (e.g., Bennett et al. 1994, 72; Baltrusaitis 2010, 205).
Integrated models generally build on Glenn Snyder’s secondary “Alliance Security
Dilemma” (1984) to formulate expectations on the link between alliance politics
and contributions to multilateral operations. This postulates that members of mil-
itary alliances face two countervailing pressures: fear of abandonment and fear of
entrapment. The former involves the risk of being deserted by an ally, the latter
of being entangled in a conflict central to the ally’s interests but peripheral to
one’s own. A country’s choices in the alliance security dilemma are primarily de-
termined by its relative dependence on the ally. The more a state depends on the
ally for assistance against future security threats, the more likely the costs of aban-
donment will outweigh the costs of entrapment (Walt 1987, 471–472).
More recently, scholars have argued that alliance dependence does not constitute
the only reason for states to provide support to an ally. Davidson (2011, 15) prefers
the term “alliance value” over “alliance dependence” because states “may value an
ally for myriad reasons and value does not necessarily entail dependence.” More spe-
cifically, he argues that alliance value also depends on the expected influence on an
ally, which determines whether they will be “able to leverage their ally’s power into
outcomes in their favor.” Ringsmose (2010, 330–331) agrees with this line of reason-
ing by arguing that there are two groups of NATO allies with a strong interest in a
good relationship with the United States: “Article 5ers” and “Traditional
Atlanticists.” The first group comprises the states that focus on NATO’s collective
defense principle, as enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In line with
the alliance dependence hypothesis, it comprises states that perceive a resurging
Russian threat and “realize their security comes in the shape of American security
guarantees” (Noetzel and Schreer 2009; Ringsmose 2010, 331). Atlanticists, in turn,
are allies who perceive themselves as states with a special relationship with
Washington, which they consider “an important key to their security and their politi-
cal clout on the international scene” (Ringsmose 2010, 331).
States might thus value their alliance with the United States because they are
dependent on the United States’ security guarantee or perceive a special relation-
ship with Washington. While “Article 5ers” perceive contributions to NATO or
US-led operations as “a fee to obtain American protection,” “Atlanticists” consid-
erer it “the price of political influence” (Ringsmose 2010, 332). Either way, alli-
ance politics constitutes a plausible explanation for why states participated in the
air strikes instead of taking a free ride off the United States’ military might. As ar-
gued by Ringsmose (2010, 325), security alliances produce excludable benefits:
the US can “resort to the intra-alliance threats (. . .), generating fear of abandon-
ment and marginalization among the smaller powers.” Even if an operation
mainly produces purely public benefits, states might still decide to participate if
its leading policymakers believe that other benefits produced by their alliance
with the United States would otherwise be withheld (Ringsmose 2010, 330–331).
4 Democratic Participation in the Air Strikes Against Islamic State
Domestic Constraints
Studies building on integrated models suggest that international-level variables like
threats and alliance politics “fare pretty well in explaining political leaders’ incen-
tives to contribute” (Oma 2012, 565). However, they consistently conclude that
domestic-level conditions need to be incorporated to fully account for a political
leader’s ability to participate. Democratic peace research is highly informative on
which domestic-level determinants can be expected to matter. A more recent direc-
tion in this line of research emphasizes the significant variation across democratic
political systems, which, in turn, is expected to affect their propensity to resort to
the use of force (e.g., Prins and Sprecher 1999). Several scholars have argued that
executives should be more constrained in parliamentary than in presidential sys-
tems, while coalition governments should be more constrained than single-party
governments. However, quantitative studies generally did not confirm these conjec-
tures (Reiter and Tillman 2002, 824; Leblang and Chan 2003).
Several scholars did find evidence for the impact of another institutional vari-
able: the degree of parliamentary involvement in decision making on the use of
force. Democratic parliaments are expected to open up governmental decision
making to public scrutiny, forcing “governments to give reasons for political deci-
sions” (Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall 2008, 4). In consequence, strong par-
liamentary veto powers should significantly restrict a government’s freedom of
military action. Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) describe how the Turkish Grand
National Assembly overturned its government’s decision to permit using Turkey
as a base for the US intervention in the 2003 Iraq war. Similarly, Reiter and
Tillman (2002, 824) conclude that “greater legislative controls over foreign policy
such as legislative power to ratify treaties is is associated with lower propensity to
initiate disputes,” while Choi (2010, 438) shows that legislative constraints “are
likely to discourage democratic executives’ use of force.”
Recent work on “parliamentary war powers” has examined the differences
“among democracies in their respective institutional arrangements regarding par-
liamentary participation in foreign military and security policy” (Dieterich,
Hummel, and Marschall 2010, 4). Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall (2010, 9–
13) distinguish four power resources of parliaments regarding security policy
making: legislative, control, communication, and dismissal resources. In a study
of European involvement in the 2003 Iraq intervention, they find a strong associa-
tion between high parliamentary war powers and weak degrees of war involvement
(Dieterich et al. 2010, 71). Wagner, Peters, and Glahn (2010, 18) focus on one as-
pect of parliamentary control: “can parliament veto a deployment that is being
planned by the executive?” Although they recognize that such an ex-ante veto is
not the only resource through which parliaments can exert control, Wagner et al.
(2010, 19) rightfully contend that no other instrument is likely to be as effective.
Partisan politics constitute a second source of cross-democratic variation. Since
political parties are an essential part of the domestic politics of mature democra-
cies, political partisanship can be expected to impact their foreign and security
policy (Mello 2014, 37). In a comprehensive study on the creation of a European
security institution outside NATO, Hofmann (2013, 204) demonstrates that ideo-
logical orientations structure government preferences in security policy. Studies
that scrutinize the link between government ideology and military intervention
also conclude that political partisanship matters for military deployment decisions.
Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) assume that political leaders, above all, want
to remain in office. Since the electoral platforms of right-leaning parties are gener-
ally more pro-military than the electoral platforms of left-leaning parties, the for-
mer are expected to be more inclined to support the use of force. Their results, as
well as the successive study of Arena and Palmer (2009), confirm this inference.
Similarly, the study of Koch and Sullivan (2010) suggests that leaders whose base
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of support is on the left of the political spectrum are more constrained by the costs
of war fighting. Stevens (2014, 12) demonstrates that the potential audience costs of
war are greater for left-wing than for right-wing governments, and Schuster and
Maier (2006) conclude that rightist parties were more inclined to support the 2003
Iraq war. States governed by a right-leaning executive can thus be expected to be
more likely to participate in the air strikes against the IS.
Several recent studies suggest that partisan politics and parliamentary veto
power should be analyzed in conjunction, rather than independently. Williams
(2014, 120), for example, argues that opposition parties are more likely to chal-
lenge ideologically dissimilar governments, while Choi (2010, 441) contends that
the level of parliamentary constraints only increases if legislative veto players and
the executive have different ideological orientations. Similarly, Mello (2012, 427)
integrates hypotheses on partisan politics and institutional structures in a sophisti-
cated multicausal model, which only expects the combination of parliamentary
veto power with a left parliament to create an effective veto point against military
deployment. In contrast, the study of Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) on Turkey’s in-
volvement in the 2003 Iraq war shows that parliaments can constitute an effective
veto point even if a single-party government enjoys a parliamentary majority. This
finding resonates with the research of Auerswald (1999, 475–480), who argues
that executives will be reluctant to use force if the decision can be hindered or
overturned by the legislature, irrespective of “the convergence or divergence of
executive-legislative preferences.”
Integrated Model
The pattern of participation in the air campaign is expected to result from a com-
plex interplay between the international and domestic variables discussed in the
previous section. States are expected to have an incentive to participate when they
consider the rise of the IS a significant threat to their national interest or highly
value their relationship with the United States. These incentives will, however,
only lead to actual contributions if combined with a right-leaning executive that
does not face a left parliament with a veto on military deployment. Figure 1 sum-
marizes these expectations in an integrated model.
Although the model integrates hypotheses from the prevailing theories on mili-
tary intervention, it does not incorporate every possible explanatory variable.
Most importantly, public opinion is not included in the model. Unfortunately, re-
liable public opinion data are only available for eleven cases. Including public
opinion would require reducing the sample of cases by two-thirds, significantly
impeding the generalizability of the study’s results. An empirical test of an alter-
native model that incorporates public opinion was conducted on the reduced
sample (cf. Appendix 1). This demonstrates that public opinion was not decisive
for participation in Operation Inherent Resolve.
FIG 1. Integrated Decision Model.
6 Democratic Participation in the Air Strikes Against Islamic State
Research Design
This section justifies the case selection, introduces the methodological approach,
and discusses the measurement of the variables.
Case Selection
The analysis is confined to a specific category of cases: the democratic members
of the anti-IS coalition. As argued extensively in the democratic peace literature,
“democratic and non-democratic regimes behave differently in their foreign pol-
icy” (Leblang and Chan 2003, 385). In consequence, only democracies are ex-
pected to share enough background characteristics to be comparable along the
variables specified in the previous section (Berg-Schlosser and de Meur 2009, 20).
Furthermore, the expectations on domestic constraints only apply to democracies.
In line with previous research, states that score 8 or higher on the Polity IV
autocracy-democracy scale are considered democracies, resulting in forty-three
democratic members of the anti-IS coalition, which are presented in Table 1
(Mello 2014, 7).
In line with the possibility principle, only cases where the outcome “participa-
tion in the air strikes” is possible are included in the analysis (Mahoney and
Goertz 2004). Fourteen democracies did not have fighter jets equipped to attack
ground targets. In consequence, these were excluded as possible contributors.
Additionally, Taiwan is excluded from the analysis because comparative data on
partisan politics is missing. After excluding these states, twenty-eight potential
democratic participants remain, all of which have combat-capable aircraft and
many of which participated in recent strike operations in the Balkans,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and/or Libya. Strikingly, however, only eight of them carried
TABLE 1. Democratic Members Coalition Against IS
Country* Combat Aircraft** Participate Country* Combat Aircraft** Participate
United States 2,451 Yes Romania 36 No
France 294 Yes Portugal 30 No
United Kingdom 223 Yes Bulgaria 28 No
Australia 95 Yes Slovakia 20 No
Canada 77 Yes Austria 15 No
The Netherlands 74 Yes Hungary 14 No
Belgium 59 Yes Croatia 10 No
Denmark 45 Yes Albania 0 No
Republic of Korea 468 No Cyprus 0 No
Taiwan 416 No Estonia 0 No
Turkey 352 No Iceland 0 No
Japan 340 No Ireland 0 No
Greece 262 No Kosovo 0 No
Italy 227 No Latvia 0 No
Germany 205 No Lithuania 0 No
Spain 168 No Luxembourg 0 No
Sweden 134 No Macedonia 0 No
Poland 106 No Moldova 0 No
Finland 62 No Montenegro 0 No
Norway 57 No New Zealand 0 No
Serbia 48 No Slovenia 0 No
Czech Republic 38 No
*Allen (2014) and Marshall, Monty G., Tedd Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. (2014) Polity IV Project,
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013. Center for Systemic Peace.
**International Institute Strategic Studies. (2014) The Military Balance 2014. London: IISS.
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out air strikes against the IS. Ten months after the first US bombs struck IS tar-
gets, none of the remaining eighteen democratic members has announced that it
will participate in offensive air operations.
Methodological Approach: Qualitative Comparative Analysis
Whether the integrated model explains the pattern of participation in the air
strikes is tested with qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), an analytical tech-
nique that allows for a systematic comparison of a large number of cases on three
to eight causal conditions. QCA is an adequate methodological choice if “there
are good reasons to believe that the phenomenon to be explained is the result of
a specific kind of causal complexity,” generally described as “multiple conjunc-
tural causation” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 77). Multiple causation implies
there are multiple paths toward an outcome; conjunctural causation that these
paths consist of combinations of conditions. In line with the notion of multiple
causation, the model comprises several pathways toward participation; in line with
conjunctural causation, these consist of combinations of international and domes-
tic conditions.
This research builds on the multivalue version of QCA (mvQCA). Although
many methodologists initially took a sceptical stance on this QCA-variant, recent
assessments have shown that mvQCA is a valuable technique for comparative anal-
ysis (Haesebrouck 2013; Thiem 2014). The choice for QCA’s multivalue variant is
informed by the nature of the conditions and the outcome. The latter presents it-
self in a dichotomous form and, therefore, cannot easily be integrated into the
fuzzy set variant of QCA (Rihoux et al. 2009, 169, Schneider and Wagemann
2012, 277). The original crisp set version of QCA, in turn, only allows dichoto-
mous variables, which would entail a significant loss of information for the condi-
tion “Threat.” Since mvQCA allows combining multichotomous conditions with a
dichotomous outcome, it is the most suited QCA variant for this study.
Measurement and Dichotomization
The coding of the outcome depends on whether a country participated in the air
strikes. Countries that had participated in the air strikes by the end of 2014 are as-
signed a score of 1 on the outcome, the other cases a score of 0 (cf. Table 1).
With the important exception of the United States’ disproportionately large con-
tribution, there are no decisive differences in the degree of participation among
the democracies that carried out air strikes. All participating democratic allies of
the United States started deploying in autumn 2014 and initially restricted strike
operations to Iraq. Canada is the only democracy that expanded its operations to
Syria, but only decided to do so in April 2015 (Zenko 2015). Its contribution of
six CF-18 Hornet fighter aircraft, which had flown 673 sorties by June 2015, is sim-
ilar to the contribution of the other democracies (Canadian Armed Forces 2015).
Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands deployed between six and eight F-16s
each, which, respectively, had flown around 600, 375, and 600 sorties by May 2015
(Ministerie van Defensie 2015; Forsvarskommando 2015; Howorth 2015). France
contributed nine Rafaele and six Mirage fighter aircraft, which on average flew
ten to fifteen sorties per week.2 Australia contributed six F/A-18 Hornets, which
carried out around 500 sorties by the end of May 2015 (Australian Government
Department of Defence 2015). The UK deployed eight Tornado fighters and four
2This contribution was augmented significantly after the Charlie Hebdo Shooting of January 2015. Between
February till April 2015, the French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle was deployed in the region with an additional
twenty strike aircraft. During these two months, French flew an average of 60 sorties per week.
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Reaper drones, which had carried out around 200 strike operations by the end of
March 2015 (Norton-Taylor 2015).
The condition “Threat” was divided into three categories, respectively corre-
sponding to a high (2), intermediate (1), and low (0) levels of threats. Countries
that suffered a high number of casualties in recent terrorist acts committed by in-
dividuals tied to jihadist terrorist groups or with at least 150 foreign fighters are
coded 2. Hereby, all countries with a high number of foreign fighters, either
absolute or relative to their populations, are comprised in the category that corre-
sponds to high threat. A score of 0 was assigned to cases that had no foreign fight-
ers or high-casualty terrorist attacks. An intermediate category 1 was created for
the cases with more than 50 but fewer than 150 reported foreign fighters.
Estimates of each country’s foreign fighters and casualties suffered in terrorist
acts committed by jihadist terrorist groups between 1993 and 2013 are listed in
Table 2.
TABLE 2. Balance of Threats
Foreign Fighters Terrorism***
Country Estimate* Per capita** Attacks Fatalities Threat
Australia 250 10.8 0 0 2
Austria 150 17.7 0 0 2
Belgium 440 39.3 1 0 2
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0
Canada 100 2.8 1 0 1
Croatia 0 0 1 1 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 150 26.7 0 0 2
Finland 70 12.9 0 0 1
France 1,200 18.2 3 8 2
Germany 600 7.4 2 0 2
Greece 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0
Italy 80 1.3 0 0 1
Japan 0 0 0 0 0
Norway 60 11.8 0 0 1
Poland 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0
Romania 0 0 0 0 0
Serbia 70 9.8 0 0 1
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0
South Korea 0 0 0 0 0
Spain 100 2.1 1 191 2
Sweden 180 18.8 3 0 2
The Netherlands 250 14.9 1 1 2
Turkey 600 8 32 92 2
United Kingdom 600 9.4 5 57 2
United States 100 0.3 3 2997 2
*Neumann, Peter R. (2015) “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses
Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s.” ICSR Insights. Available at http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-
total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/. (Accessed February 2, 2015.)
**Per-million population, based on: World Bank. (2014) World Development Indicators. Available at
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL. (Accessed June 10, 2015.)
***National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013)
“Global Terrorism Database.” Available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. (Accessed June 10, 2015.)
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Two conditions are included that reflect expectations on alliance politics:
“Alliance Dependence” and “Alliance Value.” The former comprises the states that
are dependent on the United States’ security guarantee, the latter the states that
perceive a special relationship with Washington. The coding of both conditions
builds on scholarly literature, which is very consistent on which states show a
strong interest in a good relationship with the United States (cf. Howorth 2007,
146–160; Græger and Haugevik 2009; Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013). Since
some of the consulted studies use a state’s propensity to commit forces to US-led
operations as an indicator of its value for its alliance with the United States, coding
conditions on the basis of these studies might seem to result in tautological reason-
ing. However, the consulted research generally bases a state’s relationship with the
United States on a wider set of indicators, like historical ties with the United
States, the explicit identification of a special relationship with Washington, geo-
graphical location, or a preference for NATO over alternative security institutions.
The East European countries were assigned a score of 1 on “Alliance
Dependence” since they perceive a resurging Russian threat and are dependent
on NATO’s collective defense provision to balance it (Menon and Lipkin 2003;
Noetzel and Schreer 2009; Ringsmose 2010). Similarly, Japan and South Korea
are dependent on support of the United States in their long-standing conflicts
with, respectively, China and North Korea (Baltrusaitis 2010, 39–89; Chanlett-
Avery 2011; Santoro and Warden 2015). States that are not particularly dependent
on the United States’ security guarantee but nevertheless perceive themselves as
strong Atlanticists are coded 1 on “Alliance Value.” This category comprises
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
(Howorth 2007, 146–160; Græger and Haugevik 2009; Biehl et al. 2013; Bisley
2013, 403; Dobell 2014, 395; Massie 2014). In line with Ringsmose (2010), Norway
was assigned a score of 1 on both conditions. Because it shares a border with
Russia, Norway is particularly dependent on the support of the United States for
its national security. However, it also considers its strong relationship with the
United States a way “to be heard in the international arena” (Græger 2005, 90;
Græger and Haugevik 2009, 20).
Since an ex-ante veto is generally considered the strongest form of parliamentary
involvement in decisions on the use of force, countries where parliament either
has a legal or a de facto veto were assigned a score of 1 (H€anggi 2004, 14; Mello
2012, 432). Information on parliamentary veto powers was retrieved from the parl-
con data set (Wagner et al. 2010). Since this only assigns parliamentary war
powers up till 2004 and does not include South Korea, this information was cross-
checked and supplemented with more recent sources (i.e., Born, Fuior, and
Lazzarini 2008; Konishi and Manyin 2009; Dieterich et al. 2010; Biehl et al. 2013).
The level of parliamentary involvement differs significantly among the cases,
ranging from a legal obligation of prior parliamentary consent for all military
TABLE 3. Parliamentary War Power
Score Parliamentary Powers Cases
1 Legal veto without
exception
Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Japan, Serbia, South Korea,
Spain, and Turkey
Legal veto without
relevant exception
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania,
Slovak Republic, and Sweden
De facto veto Netherlands, Norway, and United Kingdom
0 Ambiguous veto Italy and the United States
No veto power Australia, Belgium, Canada, France,
Greece, Portugal, and Poland
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deployments to the absence of parliamentary involvement in actual decision mak-
ing. Three categories are situated between these two extremes. First, operations
conducted under formal organizations are exempt from prior parliamentary ap-
proval in some of the cases. Since the air strikes against the IS were conducted by
a coalition of the willing, no such exception applied to the operation. In conse-
quence, these countries were assigned a score of 1. Second, seeking parliamentary
approval is not a legal norm but constitutes an unwritten rule in the Netherlands,
Norway, and, since the government’s defeat over military action in Syria in August
2013, the United Kingdom. Because their governments could not reasonably be
expected to participate in the air strikes without parliamentary consent, these
countries are assigned a score of 1. A third category consists of states with ambigu-
ous legislation, but where parliamentary veto powers are generally considered rel-
atively weak. In consequence, these countries were coded 0. Table 3 summarizes
parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions.
The coding of the ideological orientation of the cases’ executive and parlia-
ment draws on the Right-Left (RILE) indicator of the Comparative Manifesto
Project, which is based on quantitative content analyses of election programs
(Volkens et al. 2015). In line with previous studies (Palmer et al. 2004; Mello
2012, 436–437), party positions (n) were aggregated into an overall measure of ex-
ecutive ideological orientation by summing up each government party’s ideologi-
cal position (i) on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by its proportion of the total
number of government seats (s), as specified in the following equation:
TABLE 4. Party Politics
Executive Parliament
Country RILE* Right RILE* Right
Australia 22.98 1 5.74 1
Austria 9.93 0 7.75 0
Belgium 7.15 0 2.63 0
Bulgaria 33.84 0 18.04 0
Canada 26.27 1 3.98 1
Croatia 14.73 0 13.55 0
Czech Republic 18.96 0 16.87 0
Denmark 4.91 0 3.53 0
Finland 8.71 0 8.26 0
France 32.84 0 21.63 0
Germany 7.44 0 11.41 0
Greece 23.5 1 7.08 1
Hungary 13.31 1 4.82 1
Italy 5.05 0 11.28 0
Japan 5.6 1 1.89 0
Norway 10.9 1 9.29 0
Poland 1.71 0 5.53 1
Portugal 14.63 1 6.19 1
Romania 32.03 0 34.62 0
Serbia 19.47 1 7.92 1
Slovakia 1.71 1 2.49 1
South Korea 9.73 0 0.15 0
Spain 3.45 0 13.51 0
Sweden 1.46 1 10.05 0
The Netherlands 8.59 1 5.91 1
Turkey 8.97 0 12.99 0
United Kingdom 15.52 1 8.46 1
United States 6.45 0 12.06 1
*Based on: Volkens et al. (2015a).
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Xn
i¼1
sirli
s
: (1)
Similarly, the positions of the parties represented in parliament (n) were aggre-
gated into an overall measure of parliamentary ideological orientation by sum-
ming up each party’s (j) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by
its proportion of the total number of seats in parliament (s). Executives and par-
liaments with a positive score were coded 1 since a score above 0 corresponds to
parties that make more right than left statements in their manifestos. Table 4
summarizes the aggregated RILE scores.
Analysis and Results
The mvQCA-procedure proceeds in two steps.3 First, the data is synthesized in a
truth table, which contains a row for every possible combination of conditions.
Each case is attributed to the row that corresponds to its specific combination;
rows without empirical cases are considered logical remainders. The truth table is
presented in Table 5.
Subsequently, Boolean algebra is used to minimize the truth table. Depending
on the remainders included in the process, minimization results in different solu-
tion types. If all remainders that lead to a less complex solution are incorporated,
minimization results in the parsimonious solution; if only the remainders that
TABLE 5. Truth Table
Conditions Outcome
Row TH AD AV RE RP PV Strike Cases
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 Belgium, France
2 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 Netherlands, UK
3 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 US
4 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 Canada
5 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 Australia
6 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 Denmark
7 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 Austria, Germany,
Spain, Turkey
8 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Slovakia
9 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 Hungary, Romania,
South Korea
10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Italy
11 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 Greece
12 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 Serbia
13 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 Croatia
14 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 Finland
15 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 Sweden
16 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 Poland
17 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 Japan
18 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 Portugal
19 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 Norway
(Notes. AD, alliance dependence; AV, alliance value; PV, parliamentary veto; RE, right executive; RP,
right parliament; TH, threat.)
3The results in this article were generated using R software, in particular the QCA package for R, version 1.1-4
(Dus¸a and Thiem 2014; R Development Core Team 2014; Thiem and Dus¸a 2013).
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correspond to theoretical expectations are incorporated, it results in the interme-
diate formula.4 In line with the suggestion of Schneider and Wagemann (2012,
279), most recent QCA applications focus on the latter solution. However,
Baumgartner (2014, 840) has convincingly demonstrated that intermediate solu-
tion formulas cannot be causally interpreted and argues that resource must be
made to the parsimonious formula if QCA is applied to test causal hypotheses
(Baumgartner 2014, 854). Unfortunately, the parsimonious formula is not without
flaws since it forces researchers to introduce untenable simplifying assumptions.
This study presents both the parsimonious and intermediate solution. The for-
mer includes the conditions that distinguish combinations that are consistently
linked to the outcome from those that are not. In line with Ragin and Fiss (2008,
204), the terms of the parsimonious formula are considered the “core” causal con-
ditions. The conditions that are added in the intermediate solution are present in
the cases that display the outcome and can only be removed by making assump-
tions about logical remainders that are at odds with theoretical expectations. In
line with Ragin and Fiss (2008, 204), these are considered “complementary” or
“contributing” conditions.
Tables 6 and 7 present the intermediate and parsimonious solutions for, respec-
tively, the presence and the absence of the outcome.5 Two descriptive measures
are used to evaluate both solution types: consistency and coverage.6 The former
provides a descriptive measure of the extent to which the empirical data confirms
that the solution consistently produces the outcome and approaches unity as the
data provides stronger evidence. Coverage describes the relevance of the formulas
and approaches unity as a causal path becomes more relevant.
The parsimonious solution of the outcome’s presence shows that the combina-
tion of a high “Threat” with either the absence of “Parliamentary Veto” or the
presence of “Alliance Value” constitutes a core causal path toward participation.
The intermediate solution indicates that these are not linked to contributing con-
ditions. The third and fourth causal paths of the parsimonious solution show that
the combination of “Alliance Value” and an intermediate “Threat” with either the
absence of “Parliamentary Veto” or the absence of “Alliance Dependence” also
constitutes a core causal path. Both are linked to two contributing conditions:
“Right Executive” and “Right Parliament.”
The analysis of the outcome’s absence demonstrates that four core causal paths
consistently lead to nonparticipation. The first core causal path constitutes
“Alliance Dependence,” which is linked to two contributing conditions:
“Parliamentary Veto” and absence of “Right Parliament.” The second core causal
path, the absence of “Threat,” is linked to three (combinations of) contributing
conditions: absence of “Alliance Dependence” and the combination of absence of
“Alliance Value” with either “Right Executive” absent or “Parliamentary Veto” pre-
sent. The third core causal path combines the absence of “Alliance Value” with”
Parliamentary Veto.” The intermediate solution indicates that it is linked to two
sets of contributing conditions: the absence of “Threat” and the combination of
absence of “Alliance Dependence” with absence of “Right Parliament.” The com-
bination of absence of “Alliance Value” with intermediate “Threat” constitutes the
fourth core casual path, which is linked to one contributing condition: absence of
“Alliance Dependence.”
4If no remainders are incorporated, this results in the “complex solution.” The latter is presented in Appendix
2.
5The following assumptions were made for the production of the intermediate solution. The presence of a high
or intermediate “Threat,” “Alliance Value,” “Alliance Dependence,” “Right Parliament,” and “Right Executive” were
linked to participation, as was the absence of “Parliamentary Veto.”
6Consistency and coverage are, respectively, calculated with the formula
P
minðXi; YiÞ=PðXiÞ andP
minðXi; YiÞ=PðYiÞ, in which X denotes the membership scores in the causal combination and Y the scores in
the outcome (Haesebrouck 2015).
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Interpretation
Arriving at intermediate and parsimonious formulas is not the ultimate goal of
QCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 280). Instead, solutions must be related
back to the cases and theoretical expectations (Rihoux and de Meur 2009, 65).
The results of the QCA confirm that alliance politics, threats, and parliamentary
TABLE 6. Parsimonious and Intermediate Solution “Air Strikes”
Parsimonious Solution Intermediate Solution
Coverage Consis-
tency
Coverage Consis-
tency
Cases
Path Raw Unique Raw Unique
1 TH(2)*AV(1) 0.5 0.375 1 TH(2)*AV(1) 0.5 0.375 1 Denmark,
Netherlands,
UK, Australia
2 TH(2)*PV(0) 0.5 0.375 1 TH(2)*PV(0) 0.5 0.375 1 Belgium, France,
US, Australia
3 TH(1)*AV(1)*AD(0) 0.125 0 1 TH(1)*AV(1)*AD(0)
*PV(0)*RE(1)*RP(1)
0.125 0.125 1 Canada
4 TH(1)*AV(1)*PV(0) 0.125 0 1
Total 1 1 Total 1 1
(Notes. AD, alliance dependence; AV, alliance value; PV, parliamentary veto; RE, right executive; RP,
right parliament; TH, threat. Multiplication “*” refers to conjunction of conditions).
TABLE 7. Parsimonious and Intermediate Solution “No Air Strikes”
Parsimonious Solution Intermediate Solution
Coverage Consis-
tency
Coverage Consis-
tency
Cases
Path Raw Unique Raw Unique
1 AD(1) 0.45 0.05 1 AD(1)*PV(1)*RP(0) 0.05 0.05 1 Norway (Bulgaria,
Czech Republic,
Hungary,
Japan, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia,
South Korea)
2 TH(0) 0.55 0.1 1 TH(0)*AD(0) 0.15 0.10 1 Greece, Portugal,
Croatia
TH(0)*AV(0)*RE(0) 0.25 0.05 1 Poland, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech
Republic, Slovakia
TH(0)* AV(0)*PV(1) 0.4 0.2 1 Hungary, Japan,
Slovakia,
Romania, South
Korea Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech
Republic,
3 AV(0)*PV(1) 0.70 0.25 1 AV(0)*PV(1)*AD(0)*RP(0) 0.35 0.25 1 Austria, Germany,
Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, Croatia,
Finland
AV(0)*TH(1)*AD(0) 0.15 0.1 1 Italy, Serbia, Finland
Total 1 1 Total 1 1
(Notes. AD, alliance dependence; AV, alliance value; PV, parliamentary veto; RE, right executive; RP,
right parliament; TH, threat. Multiplication “*” refers to conjunction of conditions).
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veto power are vital determinants for participation in the air strikes. In contrast,
the results do not decisively demonstrate a link between partisan politics and par-
ticipation in the air strikes.
The pattern of participation in the air strikes against the IS does not convinc-
ingly confirm that executive or parliamentary ideology was decisive for participa-
tion in the air strikes. The parsimonious solutions of the outcome’s presence and
absence do not include a single condition on political partisanship, indicating
that ideological differences were not necessary to distinguish participants from
nonparticipants. The intermediate solutions do include conditions on ideology.
In line with theoretical expectations, the absence of either “Right Executive” or
“Right Parliament” are contributing conditions of the first three paths for the out-
come’s absence, while their presence is a contributing condition of the third and
fourth core causal paths toward participation in the air strikes. The latter are the
only combinations for participation that include an intermediate rather than a
high level of threats, suggesting that right-leaning executives require fewer threats
to resort to the use of force. However, since it was not included in the parsimoni-
ous formulas, the incorporation of “Right Executive” could be an artifact of the
theoretical assumptions made for the production of the intermediate solution.
The lack of conclusive evidence that links partisan politics to participation
might be related to the nature of the operation against the IS, which differs signif-
icantly from the cases that are generally included in studies that link military de-
ployment to government ideology. The latter generally focus on militarized inter-
state disputes or, more recently, on the 2003 Iraq war. Unlike the 2003 Iraq war,
the operation against IS does not constitute “a typical case for a conflict over
which to expect partisan dispute” (Mello 2012, 426). One of the reasons why the
military operation was launched in August 2014 was the deteriorating humanitar-
ian crisis in Northern Iraq (Henderson 2014, 209).7 In a comprehensive study on
the link between partisan politics and participation in peace enforcement opera-
tions, Rathbun (2004, 197, 2007, 399) argues that leftist parties are actually more
likely to support humanitarian interventions since they consider the promotion of
the welfare of other countries part of their national interest. Right-leaning parties,
on the other hand, have a more exclusive conception of their national interest
and, therefore, only support operations if more narrow national interests are at
stake. Since the operation against the IS pursued humanitarian goals and coun-
tered a threat to the participants’ interests, both left- and right-leaning parties
had reasons to support the operation. In consequence, the air strikes definitely
do not constitute a most likely case for the hypotheses on partisan politics.
The results are less ambiguous with regards to the other domestic-level variable:
parliamentary veto power. The absence of a legislative veto is a core causal condi-
tion of two paths toward the presence of the outcome, while its absence consti-
tutes a core and/or contributing condition of several paths toward its absence. In
line with the expectations of Auerswald (1999) and conclusions of Kesgin and
Kaarbo (2010), the analyses show it is a relevant condition, irrespective of partisan
politics. However, the first and last two core causal paths demonstrate that the
prospect of legislative meddling did not inhibit participation if the combination
of a strong threat and high alliance value provided states a strong incentive to
participate.
The results clearly confirm the balance-of-threats hypothesis. Every causal path
of the parsimonious solution for the outcome’s presence includes either strong
or intermediate threats, while the parsimonious solution for the outcome’s ab-
sence shows that the absence of threats is sufficient for nonparticipation. A high
threat generally implies a relatively large number of foreign fighters, which
7In the course of July 2014, the IS had carried out horrific genocidal attacks on a range of Christian and Yazidi
towns, forcing them to retreat to Mount Sinjar (Stansfield 2014, 1337).
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suggests the latter constitutes a vital incentive for states to participate. This is re-
markable since experts have warned that Western intervention is “a great recruit-
ing sergeant” for Islamic extremists and the air strikes increased the probability of
terrorist attacks by returning IS fighters (Byman and Shapiro 2014; Lister 2014,
97; Witney 2014). Nevertheless, the pattern of participation is clearly linked to the
number of foreign fighters.
Anecdotal evidence further confirms that foreign fighters were an important
determinant for participation in the air strikes. An official at the Belgian ministry
of foreign affairs, for example, suggested that the threat of returning foreign
fighters was the single most important reason why Belgium participated in the air
strikes.8 Similarly, British Prime Minister Cameron has called the risk of British
Islamist radicals returning from Syria and Iraq to attack Britain “the biggest na-
tional security threat,” while Australian Prime Minister Abbott announced that
Australia would contribute fighter jets to the US-led coalition shortly after the
Australian police foiled a plot by Islamic State jihadists to conduct “demonstration
killings” (Feast 2014; Winning 2014). Conversely, when the Czech Republic an-
nounced it would not participate in the air strikes against the IS, its police presi-
dent announced that the IS did not pose a threat to the Czech Republic and
there was no information that anyone from its territory was participating in the ac-
tivities of the Islamic State (Willoughby 2014).
Finally, the results suggest remarkable inferences on the link between alliance
politics and military deployment. “Alliance Value” was a causal ingredient of sev-
eral paths toward participation, while “Alliance Dependence” was sufficient for
nonparticipation. In line with theoretical expectations, perceiving a special rela-
tionship with Washington thus constituted an important incentive to participate.
Strikingly, however, dependence on the United States’ security guarantee actually
inhibited contributions. This is especially surprising for the so-called “Article
5ers” (cf. supra). Because of Russia’s interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine
in the first half of 2014, the perceived threat for countries situated in Russia’s vi-
cinity was at a post–Cold War height at the time Washington was mobilizing allies
to fight the IS (Allison 2014, 1255). In consequence, the “Article 5ers” should be
most likely cases of the alliance dependence hypothesis. The latter expects greater
tension with an adversary to increase a state’s dependence on an ally, which, in
turn, should increase a state’s propensity to provide support to its partners
(Snyder 1984, 472; Kupchan 1988, 330–333).
A possible explanation for the nonparticipation of the “Article 5ers” is the wan-
ing commitment of the Central and Eastern European states to the transatlantic
alliance. While these countries loyally supported the United States during the first
two decades after the fall of communism, the close ties with the United States be-
gan to unravel after 2008 (Longhurst 2013; Mikulova and Simecka 2013). The
waning Atlanticism in the region was caused by the rebalancing of the United
States’ foreign policy priorities away from Europe and the attempt at the begin-
ning of the first Obama administration to “reset” relations with Russia, which in-
flicted the fear that the United States would be less prone to take the Central and
Eastern European countries’ security concerns seriously (Longhurst 2013).
However, at the time when the United States was enlisting allies against the IS,
Washington announced several measures to enhance the credibility of its security
guarantees. Most importantly, the US launched the European Reassurance
Initiative, which finances the stationing of military equipment and a rotating US
presence in Eastern Europe (Lorenz 2014). In consequence, countries situated in
the region had few reasons to doubt the United States’ commitment to their secu-
rity when deciding on participation in the air strikes.
8Belgian ministry of foreign affairs, interview with author, November 21, 2014.
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A second, more plausible, explanation for the lack of Eastern European contri-
butions is that their fighter jets were not sufficiently equipped for the interven-
tion. According to the World Air Forces 2015 Report, the air forces of Bulgaria,
Romania, and Slovakia are still comprised of outdated MiG 21s and MiG 29s
(Flightglobal 2015). Other Eastern European states did have the required military
capacity to participate. Poland, for example, has a fleet of thirty-six F16s, while
Hungary and the Czech Republic each have twelve Gripen-C aircraft (Bell and
Hendrickson 2012). In the run-up to the 2011 intervention in Libya, Poland and
the Czech Republic claimed their pilots were insufficiently trained to participate,
which could be the reason for not participating in the air strikes against the IS
(Bell and Hendrickson 2012, 159; Chivviss 2014, 75). However, Norway, the only
non–Eastern European “Article 5er,” clearly did not face such technical obstacles
since its fighter jets accounted for a significant share of the air strikes during the
air campaign in Libya (Chivviss 2014, 190).
The most convincing explanation seems that the “Article 5ers” were not willing
to dispatch fighter jets to a foreign theater amid increasing tensions with Russia.
According to Neubauer et al. (2014), this is the actual reason why Norway only
provided nonlethal assistance to the international coalition against the IS.
Likewise, Poland’s Deputy Minister of Defence stressed that the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict was its country’s prime concern when he announced in
February 2015 that Poland was still not willing to take part in combat operations
against the IS (Radio Poland 2015). Instead of deploying their military assets to
demonstrate their commitment to the United States, the “Article 5ers” chose to
use them to balance Russian aggression. This does not contradict the alliance se-
curity dilemma; it only suggests there was no credible threat of abandonment.
When introducing the alliance security dilemma, Snyder (1984, 474) actually ar-
gued that the risk of abandonment decreases if “the allies’ interests that are in
conflict with the adversary are shared.” Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine
brought both the “Article 5ers” and the United States’ interests clearly in conflict
with Russia (Heisbourg 2015). In consequence, the fear of abandonment was min-
imized and keeping their fighter jets at home to deter possible Russian aggression
became the most rational option for the “Article 5ers.”
Conclusions
Why did some democratic members of the anti-IS coalition participate in the air
campaign, while others did not? This study built on integrated burden sharing
models and democratic peace research to develop a multicausal framework for ex-
plaining democratic participation in the air strikes against the IS. Its results
suggest thought-provoking conclusions on the determinants of democratic partici-
pation in the air strikes. First, only democracies that had reason to perceive the
rise of the IS as a threat to their national interest participated in the operation.
Remarkably, the analysis suggests that threat perceptions are linked to the num-
ber of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, indicating that these constituted a vital
determinant for participation in the air campaign. Second, states with a strong in-
terest in a good relationship with the United States were generally inclined to par-
ticipate in the operation. Strikingly however, this was not the case for countries
that are dependent on the United States’ security guarantees to balance Russian
aggression. Given Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine, this suggests that alliance
dependence does not incite contributions if the allies’ interests are threatened by
a common adversary. Lastly, the analysis shows that, in the absence of strong
international-level incentives, a high level of parliamentary involvement in military
deployment decisions kept governments from participating. In contrast to infer-
ences of prior research, such institutional constraints mattered irrespective of par-
tisan politics.
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While the results of this study apply to all democratic members of the interna-
tional coalition against the IS, not all conclusions can easily be generalized be-
yond the scope of Operation Inherent Resolve. Given the unprecedented number
of foreign fighters active in Syria, the operation is a most likely case for the link
between foreign fighters and military deployment decisions. Since evidentiary sup-
port from a most likely case provides only limited inferential leverage, prospective
research is necessary to assert whether this inference holds in conflicts with fewer
foreign fighters (Levy 2008, 12). Conversely, since both left- and right-leaning par-
ties had reasons to support the operation, the operation does not constitute a
most-likely case for partisan dispute. In consequence, the lack of support for the
impact of partisan politics does not clearly contradict the results of studies that
did establish a link between ideology and military intervention. However, it
does confirm the conclusions of Martini (2014, 15) and Mello (2014, 38), who, re-
spectively, argued that the impact of ideology is “tied to the context of the inter-
vention” and that “political conflict does not arise equally over all types of military
operations.” Given the resurgent Russian threat, the air strikes against the IS did
constitute a most-likely case for the alliance dependence hypothesis. In conse-
quence, the lack of support for this hypothesis does provide substantial theoreti-
cal leverage.
In line with one of the hallmarks of foreign policy analysis scholarship, the
study indicates that integrating variables situated at both the domestic and inter-
national level is necessary to fully understand foreign policy decision making
(Rosenau 1968, 311–312; Hudson 2005, 2–6). Moreover, this study showed that
QCA provides a useful methodological tool to test propositions about foreign pol-
icy behavior across political systems, allowing for “modest generalizations” on the
impact of variables situated at different levels of analysis (Rosenau 1968, 308;
Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 11–12). An important downside of a logical method
like QCA is that it does not explain the complex processes underlying foreign pol-
icy decisions. Prospective research that assesses how alliance politics, threat
perceptions, and institutional constraints were “funnelled through the subjective
understandings” of domestic decision makers would therefore serve as a valuable
complement to this study (Kaarbo 2015, 20).
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